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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DONALD J. RICHARDSON, GROVEL.
COOK and WAYNE WEAVER, individually
and for and on behalf of all similarly
situated shareholders of Major Oil
Corporation,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
No. 15691
vs.
ARIZONA FUELS CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation, EUGENE DALTON, an
individual, DEANNE J. DALTON, an
individual, and MAJOR OIL
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation,
Defendants and Appellants.

B R I E F

0 F

R E S P 0 N D E N T S

An Intermediate Appeal from the Decision of the
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, Honorable David B. Dee, District Judge
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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

Appellants incorrectly state the case.

The case

is a combination class-derivative action, in which the lower
court appointed a receiver to preserve the assets of Major
Oil Corporation for its creditors and shareholders.

DISPOSITION IN THE

LO~lliR

COURT

Plaintiffs' Motions for class eertification under
Rule 23, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and for appointment
of a Receiver under Rule 66, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
were granted by the Honorable David B. Dee, District Judge of
the Third Judicial District Court, who held that "specific
minute differentiation" delimiting the type of class action
"is without merit at this stage in the proceedings" and that
"notice should be given to the members of the class pursuant
to Rule 23 (c)" (R.lOS).
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The urging of appellants that "the record is totally
bereftl of any evidence from which the facts of this action
can be ascertained"

(Br. 3) constitutes excessive advocacy,

l

bereft:
alternative past tense and past participle of bereave:
deprive; to strip; to leave destitute; to deprive, as by death.
Appellants evidently mean to say "devoid".

to
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particularly in light of the concession at Br. 7 that "evidence in support of an application for a receiver may be
furnished .
evidence."

by a properly verified petition used as
The trial judge had a verified petition before

him, which appellants concede was uncontroverted, yet they
evidently on the erroneous

fail to discuss its allegations

assumption that the record must be encumbered with affidavits

/
'

I

or oral testimony.

~t~

The appellees

.'_,..;--

and pursuant to leave of the Court, their amended complaint,

~~ J;'r'l

'U 'Y

4-,'v Q:v$J'~r/'JX)th of which were
v

r/

0

cl;

(plaintiffs) filed their complaint,

\'/

~ '

Q

pJ,~

verified by Wayne Weaver, one of the

\

laintiffs.

No answers or opposing affidavits were filed.

Accordingly, all well pleaded allegations of the complaint
must be taken as the facts herein.
The allegations of the verified complaint, exclusive
of those stated to be on information and belief were as follows:
The amended complaint alleges jurisdictional facts
(paragraphs 1 through 5, R. 60-61) and that the defendant
Arizona Fuels is the owner of 47% of the outstanding shares of
Major Oil (paragraph 2, R.60).

The elements of Rule 23(a),

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are alleged at paragraphs 6, 7
and 8 (R.61), including that the plaintiffs are among in
excess of 1,700 stockholders of Major Oil, residents of many
states, and that it is impracticable to name them individually
or make them parties to this action. Significant to appellants'
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urging that the trial judge did not specify one particular
type of class action for certification, the complaint alleges
alternatively each of the three types of class actions set out
in Rule 23.
The Rule 23(b) (1) elements, which are generally considered applicable to cases involving a common fund, as well
as the Rule 23(b) (2) elements, which are generally considered
applicable to suits such as civil rights actions seeking
common injunctive relief are alleged in paragraph 8 (R.61).

The

Rule 23(b) (3) elements, which relate to the common issue suit,
are also alleged in paragraph 8 (R.61).

The elements of

numerosity, impracticability of joinder, common questions of
law and fact, common defenses and that the claims of the
representative parties are typical, and the adequacy of
representation are all alleged in paragraph 9 (R.6l-62).
The complaint contains alternative alleaations in
paragraph 10 (R.62) setting up the elements of a derivative
action defined by Rule 23.1, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Paragraphs 11 and 12 (R.62) allege the facts of Major Oil
Company being under the control of and dominated by the
defendants, which are universally held to constitute an
exception to the usual requirement of a prior demand in
relation to a derivative suit.
Turning to the substance of the claims, paragraph 13
(R.62) alleges that Major Oil owned an oil refinery in Roosevelt
which was sold at a tax foreclosure sale on or about September _./
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24, 1975 by the Internal Revenue Service for taxes owing to
the United States.

Paragraph 14

(R.62-63) alleges that the

purchaser at the tax sale was Plateau Refining Company of
Farmington, New Mexico which paid $1,945,055.67 over and above
the claims of the United States and that the money was deposited into the registry of the United States Court for the
District of Utah for the benefit of the creditors of Major Oil
and that a trustee was appointed by the United States District
Court for the District of Utah to administer the funds and to
make recommendations relative to the claims of creditors.
Paragraph 27 (R.65) alleges that the defendants caused Major
Oil, through its officers, who are the defendants herein, to
acknowledge the validity of a claim against Major Oil in the
amount of $479,382.35 and caused the trustee to recommend that
an order be entered to pay that sum to defendant Arizona Fuels
and that the defendants have done nothing to object to such a
recommendation by the trustee although it is alleged in paragraph 28 (R.65) that the claim should be appealed and the
trustee should be restrained from paying those amounts until the
validity of the claim is determined.

Paragraph 39 (R.66)

alleges that the defendants have breached their fiduciary
duties to Major Oil and its shareholders and have "wilfully,
wantonly or negligently mismanaged the corporate and prudential
affairs of Major Oil" causing an injury to the corporation
and its stockholders in the sum of $2,500,000 and paragraph
14 (R.62-63) alleges that the plaintiffs, for the benefit of
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Major Oil and its shareholders, are entitled to a judgment in
that amount.
In addition, each of paragraphs 17, 23, 24, 29, 32,
37, 41, 42, 45, 47 and 51 (R. 63, 64, 65-67, 68-69) allege the
elements of damages and the facts constituting the basis for
injunctive relief.
It must be stressed that each of these allegations
are verified under oath and stand on the record uncontroverted.

None of these facts are stated on information and

belief, though the complaint does allege many more facts
which, in the nature of things, must be alleged on information and belief until the case reaches the discovery stage.
The positive allegations, which are ignored by appellants,
are nevertheless more than adequate to establish prima facie
the elements of the cause of action.

Without regard for

additional matters alleged on information and belief (which
we do not concede may be ignored entirely) these allegations
establish an adequate factual basis for the trial court's
order determining the case to be a class action and the
appointment of a receiver.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
"ABUSE OF DISCRETION" IS NOT PRESENT

In 1972 this Court adopted amended Rule 23, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, which is identical with the federal
rule governing class actions.
Insurance Company, 509 P.2d 367

Andrew v. Ideal National
(Utah 1973) is the only case

in this Court that has arisen under the new rule.

The Ideal

case did not construe the provisions of the amended rule,
although the trial court did interpret and apply its provisions on the subsequent remand.

See Andrew v. Ideal

National Insurance Company, Docket No. 182-960 (Third District,
Utah 1977).

In the absence of any Utah authority, reference

will be made to the large body of authorities which have
developed surrounding the identical federal rule.
The language of Rule 23 is plainly addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial judge.

Accordingly, it is uni-

versally held that "where [the trial court] does apply the
criteria to the facts of the case it has a broad discretion as
to whether the suit may be maintained as a class action, which
the appellate court should normally respect."
FEDERAL PRACTICE

~I

23.97 at p. 23-1951.

3 B MOORE'S

In a case arising in

the Federal District Court for the District of Utah challenging
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the exercise of discretion by the Honorable A. Sherman
Christensen, it was held that "if [the trial judge] applies
the correct criteria to the facts of the case, the decision
should be considered to be within his discretion."

Gold

Strike Stamp Company v. Christensen, 436 F.2d 791 (lOth Cir.
1970).

Numerous cases under the federal rule are unanimous in

the same conclusion.2
Accordingly, the appropriate standard for judicial
review on this interlocutory appeal is whether the trial judge
is guilty of an abuse of discretion.

Significantly the

appellants failed to address that issue in those terms or by
necessary implication.

The most that can be said for the

appellants' argument is that they claim that it was error for
the trial judge to certify a class action based upon the
allegations of the complaint.

In an effort to lend some

dignity to that claim, as previously noted, the appellants
incorrectly stated that the complaint was on allegations of
information and belief though in fact the allegations on which

Cross v. National Trust Life Insurance Co. 553 F.2d 1026 (6th Cir.
1977); King v. Kansas City Southern Industries, Inc., 519 F.2d
20 (7th Cir. 1975); Shumate & Co. v. National Association of Securities
Dealers, 509 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1975); Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1975); Kamm v. California City Development
Co., 509 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1975); Rutledge v. Electric Hose &
Rubber Co., 511 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1975); Fendler v. Westgate California
Corp., 527 F.2d 1168 (9th Cir. 1975); Brito v. Zia Co., 478 F.2d 1200
(lOth Cir. 1973); Gold Strike Stamp Co. v. Christensen, 436 F.2d 791,
793 (lOth Cir. 1970); New York v. International Pipe & Ceramics Corp.,
410 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1969).
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the class action certification hinges were not stated to be on
information and belief and were verified under oath by the
named plaintiff.
In any event, contrary to the urging of the appellant,
this Court has held under the former equity practice that it
was error for a trial judge not to certify a class action based
upon the allegations of the complaint if they were uncontroverted, as the verified allegations were uncontroverted in
this case.

West Point Irrigation Co.

~

Maroni

Ditch Co., 14 Utah 127, 46 Pac. 762 (1896).

~

Mt. Pleasant

This Court's

holding in the West Point case, moreover, is in accord with
precedent under the identical federal rule (i.e., the predecessor to amended Rule 23).
Corp., 383

u.s.

363, 373

Cf. Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels

(1966) where the reversal of a class

action complaint on grounds that the plaintiff was illiterate
and could not understand her verification was reversed:
We cannot construe Rule 23 or any other one
of the Federal Rules as compelling courts to
summarily dismiss, without any answer or
argument at all, cases like this where grave
charges of fraud are shown by the record to
be based on reasonable beliefs growing out
of careful investigation.
The basic purpose
of the Federal Rules is to administer justice
through fair trials, not through summary
dismissals as necessary as they may be on
occasion . . . If rules of procedure work as
they should in an honest and fair judicial
system, they not only permit, but should as
nearly as possible guarantee that bona fide
complaints be carried to an adjudication on
the merits.
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The federal courts construe the requirements of the revised
rule, which this Court is called upon to address for the first
time, the same.

See, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, 1 pt. 2

MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, which governs administration of
class actions in the federal courts and declares

contrary

to the urging of Defendants herein -- that "some or all of the
material facts may be established by pleadings" and that
"where the issues are simple, or are otherwise fully developed
in stipulations or factual briefings, it is conceivable that
the class action determination can be made without a hearing."
Id. at 111.40.

See also, Wolfson v. Solomon, 54 F.R.D. 584,

589(S.D.N.Y. 1972):
The findings required under Rule 23, in
the light of their meaning under our
court's Civil Rule llA [requiring the
filing of a motion for class action
determination within 60 days] do not
mandate an evidentiary hearing in every
case.
Pleadings and affidavits will
normally suffice to supply the data
required.
(emphasis added)--Accord, Gold Strike Stamp Co. v. Christensen, 436 F.2d 791
(lOth Cir. 1973).
Apropos the argument of the appellants that the
action of the trial judge was in error, this court has held
that the "abuse of discretion" standard is not satisfied by
merely urging that the relief sought could have been granted
by the trial court.

Warren v. Dickson Ranch Company, 123

Ut. 416, 260 P.2d 741 (1953).

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 4th Ed.
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1968 defines the term to contemplate an action by the trial
judge which is "clearly against logic and effect of such facts

1

as are presented in support of the application or against the
reasonable and probable deductions to be drawn from the facts"
and cites in support of that definition State
Utah 115, 27 P.2d 39 (1933).

~

Draper, 83

Black states further that the

concept implies that the court was not "discreet, circumspect,
prudent and exercising cautious judgment" citing State Board
of Examiners

~Spears,

79 Colo. 588, 247 Pac. 563,565

(1926).

The appellants fail to even approach the appropriate
standards.

There is no allegation that Judge Dee's order

defies logic or that it is contrary to such facts as were
presented in support of the request for class action
tion.

certific~

Indeed, the appellants failed to present any facts at

all by way of affidavit or otherwise and Judge Dee was confronted with nothing other than the verified allegations of
the complaint. The appellants do not allege, nor indeed could
they allege, that Judge Dee was not discreet or circumspect or
that he failed to exercise cautious judgment.
Appellants' arguments that a particular subdivision
of the class action rule should have been invoked, or that the
related provision of Rule 23.1 rather than Rule 23 should be
invoked cannot constitute abuse of discretion because of the
contemplation of Rule 23 that the trial judqe may review and
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1

modify his determinations as the case progresses.

That was

made clear by the Tenth Circuit in the Gold Strike case,
supra:
Since the order allowing the class action
does not have finality required for appeal
under F.R. Civ. P. 54(a), a very serious question
exists as to whether the merits of Gold Strike's
petition should be examined at all.

*

*

*

For example, under the provisions of Rule 23(c)
(4) and 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure the trial judge maintains a great degree
of control over the conduct of a class action
trial.
This control has been commented on by
this court in Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94
(lOth Cir. 1968), cert. denied 394 U.S. 928, and
allows the trial judge to modify or terminate
the action as a class action if it develops that
the decision to so proceed was inappropriate.
There is no reason to believe that the trial court will not
exercise that discretion appropriately if the circumstances
should subsequently warrant.
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POINT II
APPELLANTS' ARGUMENTS ARE REJECTED BY THE HISTORICAL
DEVELOPMENT OF CLASS ACTIONS AND RELATED DOCTRINES

The language of the revised Rule 23, Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, was adopted by this Court in 1972.

Because

prior decisions of this Court have never dealt significantly
with class actions, and have never construed the revised rule
at all, we present here for the convenience of the Court a
brief discussion of the background of the revised rule.

That

history vividly illustrates why appellants' contentions are in
error.
Class actions, both in this country and at the
common law, were creatures of necessity invented by equity
jurisprudence to handle cases where all interested persons
could not be joined, or where they were so numerous that their
joinder was impracticable and unnecessary:
The King of Brogdignag gave it for his opinion that
"whoever could make two ears of corn, or two blades
of grass to grow upon a spot of ground where only
one grew before, would deserve better of mankind,
and do more essential service to his country than
the whole race of politicians put together." In
matters of justice, however, the benefactor is he
who makes one lawsuit grow where two grew before .
. Questions of law or fact which would otherwise be
tried over and over can by this means be determined
once for all in a single proceeding.
This avoidance
of multiplicity of suits saves the parties from
needless expense and vexation, economizes the time
of judges and jurymen, and frees the dockets for the
affairs of other litigants.
Chaffee, SOME PROBLEHS
OF EQUITY, 149 (1950):
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The Advisory Committee to the federal rule, from
which the Utah rule was adopted verbatim, drew heavily upon
three prescient treatises:

Chaffee, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY,

245-46, 256-57 (1950); Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary
Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 684 (1941);
Keefe, Levy & Donovan, Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33 Corn. L. Q.
327 (1948).

Those treatises are virtually required reading

for one who would understand the nature and effect of class
actions under the revised rule.

A.

Common Law Antecedents
The proliferation of class actions durinq the past

two decades, more or less, in fields like securities law,
consumer frauds, and civil rights, has created an impression
of their being a new device.
devices at all.

They are not, however, new

They have their roots in equity practice

extending back more than 300 years to the common law.
The classic Cooley lectures of Chancellor Zechariah
Chaffee, Jr., delivered at the University of Michigan in 1949, 3
trace the history of modern class suits 4 from at least as
early as 1701, with the common law Bill of Peace with multiple
parties.

Chaffee, supra at 163-166.

Chaffee, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY,
4

The common law lord of a

(1950).

See also MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1123.02[1).
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manor had occasional need to settle matters like customs at
his mill against the tenants, or the tenants a need to settle
matters like their fishing rights against the lord.
cases the Bill of Peace was employed.

In such

While it was possible

1

to join all of the tenants as plaintiffs or defendants, beca~l
of their sheer numbers it was thought unnecessary to do so.

A,

representative few sued, or were sued, for all:
Hence it was far cheaper and more convenient to
have a single suit in chancery, which was
accustomed to handle polygonal controversies
it was an obvious waste of time to try the
common question of law and fact over and over
in separate actions . . . It was much more
economical to get everybody into a single
chancery suit and settle the common questions
once and for all
From such a bill of peace it was a natural step
to a representative suit.
The very identity
of interests which made it easy to bring everybody in, also made it somewhat superfluous to
do so.
If the claims of A, B, C, and D were exactly
like those of E, F, G, and H, and if A, B, C,
and D were stout fellows, would not they be
able to say all that could be said for E, F,
G, and H as well on their own behalf? Chaffee,
supra at 201.
The English courts then extended the concept of the
bill of peace cases to controversies more like the modern
class action, such as suits involving the joint stock companiM
which became popular with the burst of the South Sea bubble.
In such suits constructive trusts were imposed for the benefit

14 by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of large numbers of joint venturers on property which the
company's agent had improperly appropriated to his own use.
Chaffee quotes Lord Cottenham in Taylor v. Salmon, 4 Myl. &

cr.

134, 141-2

( 1838 l :

[It is] the duty of this Court to adapt its
practice . . . to the existing state of society,
and to apply its jurisdiction to all those new
cases which, from the progress daily making
in the affairs of men, must continually arise,
and not . . . decline to administer justice,
and to enforce rights for which there is no
other remedy."
The English judges, according to Chaffee,
had no hesitation in jumping, not only the
obstacle of unjoined parties, but also the
obstacle of binding them without a day in
court. When the representatives on the
record were such as fairly and honestly to
try the general questions at issue and not
betray the interests of their many absent
associates, then the English judges saw no
sense in letting the omitted persons
relitigate matters on which they had
presumably already heard whatever was worth
saying.
Chaffee, supra, at 213.
But the common law Bill of Peace with multiple
parties became impractical to the extent that the English
judges became preoccupied, just as Appellants are urging this
Court to do herein, with notions like privity, community of
interest, and res judicata.

During the period of its decline,

the Bill of Peace with multiple parties was frequently construed as applying only to "Cases where there is one general
right in all the parties, that is, where the character of the
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parties, so far as the right is concerned, is homogenous."
Chaffee, supra, at 165, quoting from Newton v. Egmont, 5 Sim.
130, 137 (1832).

B.

The Early American Class Action
The common law Bill of Peace with multiple parties

was adopted early in the United States as the "class action".
Just as Lord Eldon fostered the doctrine in England, Justice
Story formulated the American doctrine.
FEDERAL PRACTICE 1123.02 [1] at page 23-38.

See, 3B MOORE'S
As in England,

class actions were created out of necessity to handle suits in
which the large numbers involved rendered it impractical to
join them all.

Hansberry~

Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41

(1940).

One of the earl1est cases in the U.S. was Smith v. Swormstedt,
16 How.

[57 U.S.] 288

(1853) in which it was held that a

"common issue" suit by a few may be binding on the rights of
many, provided the suit is fairly conducted.
The class action was embodied in Federal Equity Rule
38, adopted in 1912, which declared that "When the question is ,
one of common or general interest to many persons constituting
a class so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them
all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the
whole".

Utah adopted the equity Rule in

(1888).

Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur

Co~p.

~Cauble,

L. Utah §3184

255 U.S. 356 (1921

held that the decree in such a case may be res judicata even
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against those who are not before the Court, if the representation was adequate.

Accord, West Point Irrigation Co ~Maroni

& Mt. Pleasant Ditch Co., 14 Utah 127, 46 Pac.

762 (1896).

The binding effect of class action judgments is thus
dependent upon the same equity concepts as the doctrine of
collateral estoppel.

RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §68 (1942).

See

also Justice Traynor's opinion in Bernhard~ Bank of
America, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 8ll-13, 122 P.2d 892, 894-5 (1942).
The derivative action, which appellants would have
this Court hold is somehow inconsistent with- the class action,
derives from the same equity concepts. The derivative action
was Equity Rule 27, and was incorporated with the class action
in Rule 23(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1937).
C.

The Modern Class Action
With the merger of law and equity under the rules of

civil procedure the former equity practice was adopted in Rule
23, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The rule as it existed

prior to the 1972 revision attempted to define class actions
in terms of jural relationships which resulted in the "true",
"hybrid" and "spurious" categories.

Keefe, Levy & Donovan,

supra, criticized those same classifications in the federal
rule as artificial and unrealistic:
But granting that there exist in the law
examples of distinctions based on differences
among jural relationships, does it necessarily
follow that we must make distinctions on
this basis as to the binding effect of
class suit judgments? In other words (and
without essaying facetiousness), granting
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that a black dog can be distinguished from
a white one, the distinction is of no force
when the necessity of obtaining a dog
license arises.
Is there not danger of
falling into an attitude of unthinking
formalism, like that of the old common law,
when we start assuming that all legal
distinctions are meritorious in and of
themselves and forget that they should be
constantly examined in the light of the
purpose they were originally drawn to
serve? Keefe,
Levy & Donovan, Lee
Defeats Ben Hur, 33 Corn. L.Q. 327, 332
(1948).
Kalven and Rosenfield observed that to require
strict adherence to res judicata is to vitiate the purpose of
the class action, for then "the rule is reduced to saying
that where it is impracticable to bring all the parties before
the court they must nevertheless be brought before the court."
KalveP & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class
~~:!:_t_,

8 ll.

Ch.l.

i,.

Rev. 684, 700 (1941).

Significantly, it is preoccupation with jural
r~lationships

and strict adherence to the concept of res

judicata, precisely, which appellants urge upon this Court.
Chancellor Chaffee, who the Advisory Committee relied upon,
argued eloquently against the retention of such formalistic
notions:
If a mighty wind swept away all the bills
of peace cases yet decided and dispelled
the atmosphere of unreality that hovers
about,this subject, so that we could make
a fresh start, we should never set up
formulae about privity, community of interest, and general property right.
Everybody would accept the general principle
admirably stated by Judge Woolsey: "
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the avoidance of multiplicity of suits by
every device, which is jurisdictionally
possible and practically convenient, should
be encouraged and should be one of the main
objectives of procedural administration,
and of decisions by courts in practice
cases." Then we should go on to examine
the available methods of handling a multiple
controversy, and the practical policies
which should influence a judge in choosing
among these methods.
What prevents our making this fresh start
now? Even if the doctrine of stare decisis
has any proper application to a procedural
problem of this sort, there is excellent
authority, as we have seen, for taking the
attitude suggested.
Chaffee, so~ PROBLEMS
OF EQUITY, 183 (1950).
The Advisory Committee did exactly as Chaffee had
suggested and swept away definitions based upon jural relationships.

The revised rule's three types of class actions, by

contrast, are stated in terms of controlling criteria believed
to describe in more practical terms the occasions for maintaining a class action.

The Advisory Committee's criticism of

former Rule 23 was as follows:
Difficulties with the original rule. The
categories of class actions in the original
rule were defined in terms of the abstract
nature of the rights involved: the socalled "true" category was defined as
involving "joint, common, or secondary
right"; the "hybrid" category, as involving
"several" rights related to "specific
property"; the "spurious" category, as
involving "several" rights affected by a
common question and related to common
relief.
It was thought that the definitions accurately described the situations
amenable to the class-suit device, and also
would indicate the proper extent of the
judgment in each category, which would in
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turn help to determine the res judicata
effect of the judgment if questioned in a
later action.
Thus the judgments in "true" and "hybrid"
class actions would extend to the class
(although in somewhat different ways); the
judgment in a "spurious" class action would
extend only to the parties including intervenors.
In practice the terms "joint," "common,"
etc., which were used as the basis of the
Rule 23 classification proved obscure and
uncertain.
The courts have considerable
difficulty with these terms.
Nor did the rule provide an adequate guide
to the proper extent of the judgments in
class actions. First, we find instances of
the courts classifying actions as "true" or
intimating that the judgments would be
decisive for the class where these results
seemed appropriate but were reached by dint
of depriving the word "several" of coherent
meaning.
Second, we find cases classified
by the courts as "spurious" in which, on a
realistic view, it would seem fitting for
the judgments to extend to the class.
(Citations omitted)
The revised rule,

thus, did not effect any change in

the substance of class actions, but sought to eliminate the
unrealistic formalism of the former rule and vest the trial
judge with a broad range of discretion to supervise the class
action and control its res judicata effect.

See 1 MOORE'S

RULES PAMPHLET (1975) comment to Rule 23 at 535.
The "opt out" procedure, which is central to
appellants' claim that the trial judge erred, was also an
innovation with the revised Rule.

The former rule employed an

"opt in" procedure, under which the class action was viewed as
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nothing more than a "permissive joinder" device.

That phil-

osophy was also criticized by Kalven & Rosenfield, The
Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. Chi. L. Rev.
684, 687-688

(1941):

The cardinal difficulty with joinder,
however, is that it presupposes the prospective plaintiffs' advancing en masse on
the courts.
In most situations such
spontaneity cannot arise because the various
parties who have the common interest are
isolated, scattered, and utter strangers to
each other.
Thus while the necessity for
group action through joinder clearly exists,
the conditions for it do not.
It may not
be enough for society simply to set up
courts and wait for litigants to bring
their complaints -- they may never come.
It is not so much a matter of permitting
joinder as of ensuring it.
The Advisory Committee responded with the "opt out" procedure,
which ensures joinder of the interested parties unless they
make an election otherwise.
In doing so, the Advisory Committee sought to
mitigate, if not eliminate 5 , the inequity of "one way intervention", illustrated by the late Judge Ritter's much discussed decision in Union Carbide

~

Carbon Corp.

F.2d 561 (lOth Cir. 1961) pet. cert. dism. 372

~

u.s.

Nisley, 300
801 (1963).

But see Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (lOth Cir. 1968) cert. denied
394 U.S. 928 (1969) where class action procedures under the revised
rule were invoked after judgment on the merits. Hirschi illustrates
that, if the "opt out" notice is not given, the rule's purpose to
eliminate "one way intervention" also may not be accomplished and that,
in such event, Union Carbide still represents sound law.
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"One way intervention" permits the absentee class members in a
"common issue"

6

suit to sit back and wait for the result.

If

the named plaintiff won,

they then intervened and claimed the

benefits of the judgment.

If the decision was adverse, they

simply ignored it in favor of pursuing their individual rights.
The notice imposing the "opt out" requirement, directed to the
absentees early in the litigation, thus forces them to make an
election well before judgment.

It is that procedural reform,

inserted as a protection for defendants and committed to the
discretion of the trial judge, which appellants argue
against.

vigorous~~

Read in light of the history of the Rule, it is

evident that appellants simply misconceive the function and
effect of the "opt out" notice.

6 "One way intervention" is not a problem in the so called "common fund"
suits under Rule 23(b) (l), or suits involving "common rights" under
Rule 23(a) (2).
Because of the joint nature of the property interests
and rights in such suits the doctrine res judicata applied to the decree.
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i

I

POINT III
THE VERIFIED ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT
ADEQUATELY SUPPORT CLASS CERTIFICATION

Appellants' Point II, which represents the second
prong of their dual attack on the trial judge's action, is a
pedantic dissertation on counsel's view, advanced without
citation of authority, on the relative merits of a class
action vs. a derivative action, and whether the various species
of a class action are mutually exclusive of one another.

In

truth, appellants are not only without supporting authorities
for their highly formalistic view of what is really but a rule
of procedure, but their view is rejected by the history of the
revised Rule discussed in Point II, as well as by logic and
case authority under the federal rule.

Numerous cases have

held that class actions and derivative actions may be pursued
simultaneously.
Cir. 1970).

~.,

Herpich

~Wallace,

430 F.2d 792 (5th

And, though appellants evidently prefer not to

give class members the courtesy of the "opt out" procedure,
the trial judge is well within his discretion to require such
a notice.

Air Line Stewards & Stewardesses Association v.

American Airlines, 490 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1973).

A.

The Form of Class Action is not Mutually Exclusive.
Commencing at Br. 15, appellants reason that it was

error not to certify this action only under Rule 23(b) (1), which
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has to do with the "common fund" type lawsuit, rather than to
certify it under Rule 23(b) (3) as well, which has to do with
the so-called "common issue" type lawsuit.

Implicit in

appellants' arguments is that the various forms of class
action are mutually exclusive.

That position misconceives

the purpose of the amended rule, and the authorities which have
construed its identical provisions in the federal courts.

1.

A Primary Purpose of the Revised Rule
was to Abandon Formalistic Classifications.

At Br. 16 appellants urge that, "in the venerable 7
vernacular of the former Rule,

[this case must be] a 'true'

class action," and cite in support of that proposition a
Harvard Law Review student note published before the Utah
Rule, or the federal rule on which it is based, were even
promulgated.

A major purpose of the revised rule was to

escape from such formalism which had proven unworkable and
meaningless under the former rule.
PRACTICE,

~123.01[8].

See, 3 B MOORE's FEDERAL

The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 23,

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which may be considered

7
Venerable: worthy of respect or reverence by reason of age and
dignity, character, position, etc.
The vernacular appellants refer to
could hardly be "venerable", for it was discarded in the revised rule.
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relevant to the Utah Rule, are quoted at length in Point II
and expose the fallacy of appellants' argument.

The Advisory

committee declared:
Difficulties with the original rule . . . .
In practice the terms "joint," "common,"
etc., which were used as the basis of the
Rule 23 classification proved obscure and
uncertain.
The courts had considerable
difficulty with these terms . . . •
In short, appellants' arguments on this score, which
are typical of their arguments throughout, amount to a
syllogistic exercise based on a major premise that is a semantic
error (i.e., that to sue as representative of all shareholders
is necessarily to sue as representative of the corporation).
that extent appellants' argument is devoid of pertinent
analysis.

Appellants urge upon this Court a philosophy that

is not only outmoded, but rejected by the language of the
Rule which is to be construed.
2.

Authorities Support a Flexible Approach
to Class Certification.

Contrary to appellants' urging that the class may be
certified under one, and only one, subdivision of the Rule,
Professor Moore states the proposition as follows:
The three types of class suits are not
always mutually exclusive.
Indeed, at times
there is much overlap. And while a class action
of the third type may qualify less frequently as
a type one or type two class suit, a class action
that meets the requirements of either or both of
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the first two types may well satisfy the requirements of the third type.
3 B MOORE'S FEDERAL
(footnote omitted)
PRACTICE ~I 23.31[2]
Thus, class actions are frequently certified under more than
one subdivision.

~-~··

Branham v. General Electric Co., 63

FRD 667 (M.D. Tenn. 1974).
423 (E. D. Pa. 1973).

Cf.

Harris~

Dumont Co., 61 FRD

Particularly where a case is at its

inception, as this one is, the trial court should exercise its
discretion liberally.

In that regard subdivision (c) (1) of

the Rule directs that "an order under this subdivision may be
conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision
on the merits."

Subdivision (d) vests the trial judge with

further discretion, including in particular that he may enter
orders concerning the class allegations as the action

progress~.

Appellants would have this Court emasculate the discretion mandated by the Rule and cast the action in formal
strictures, at its inception, which the Advisory Committee to
the federal rule plainly effected to avoid.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

26

B.

Submission of Notice Was Within
the Discretion of the Trial Judge.
The argument, commencing at Br. 18, against ex-

tending absentee class members the right to "opt out" is also
a misconception of the nature and function of class actions.
We can concede that, so long as the trial judge is of the view
that the action is maintainable as a class action under Rule
23(b) (1)

(i_.~.,

the "common fund" type suit) notice and the

right to "opt out" is not a necessity, but under subdivision
(d) of the Rule, the trial judge has the discretion to invoke
that procedure in any type class action.

The "opt out" pro-

vision is not absolute in any event, and is but a reasonable
procedural device to determine the wishes of the absentees who
are not represented by counse1. 8

The court remains the

"guardian" of the class and determines, under Rule 23(c) (3)
who will be bound by the "common issue" type suit.

Moreover,

properly conceived, the effect of such a procedure is not to
prejudice defendants, but merely affords them the advantage of
avoiding the claims of those who opt out.

8

That is particularly so when it is considered that the absentees,
responding to a class notice without the benefit of counsel, will frequently misunderstand and take action unrelated to the action or the
contents of the notice. The court must then exercise its discretion to
determine who, consistent with well established principles of equity,
will be bound. To illustrate the point, we reproduce some of the responses
of class members in a suit by the State of North Carolina, through its
Attorney General, Robert Morgan, filing suit against five major drug firms
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The argument that those who opt out can subject
the defendants to a vexatious multiplicity of suits is sheerly
conjectural and illusory, at best.

This Court need not

8 continued
for a class composed of all persons who had purchased certain broad
spectrum antibiotic drugs in North Carolina between certain dates in
1954 and 1966:
Dear Sir:
I received this paper from you. I guess I really don't understand
it. But if I have been given one of these's drugs I was not told why.
If it means what I think it means though, I have not been with a man
in 9 years if that answers your question.
Dear Mr. Clerk:
I have your notice that I owe you $300.00 for selling drugs. I have
never sold any drugs, especially those that you have listed.
I have sold a little whiskey once in a while though.
Dear Mr. Attorney General:
I am sorry to say this but you have the wrong John Doe because in
1954 I wasn't but 3 years old and didn't even have a name. Mother named
me when I got my dr1ver's license, and that was just four years ago. My
dad signed for me to get them, and until then they just called me Baby
Doe.

I couldn't have bought any drugs at 3 years old and I am not but 19
now and haven't had a name but 4 years so you must have the wrong person.
Dear Sir:
I am unable to attend your class. I have been sick. My husband
will not be able to make it either. We would like for you to get some
one else to attend in our place.
Dear Mr. Clerk:
I would like to know why I am a party to this action that I don't
know nothing about. Who made me a party to anything? (I am a democrat.)
Dear Attorney General:
Holy greeting to you in Jesus name.
I received a card from you and
I don't understand it, and my husband can't read his. Most of the time
all I buy is olive oil for healing oil after praying over it, it is
anointed by God's power and ain't nothing like dope.
Dear Sir:
I am pleading '1uilty to the use of an envelope of Official Business
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indulge in such speculation, for the results of the notice are
now known.

Of 1,625 notices which were submitted, only 20

slightly more than 1% -- opted out.

Considering the confusion

8 continued
because I did not know if you had one available that you could not use
it. I have never done that before and will never do it again.
Dear Sir:
I have not bouth none of tat stuff from nobodie and I don't know
notin about it.
Dear Sir:
I have not been to a doctor in thirty-five years but for three times
in these long years and I got hurt in a car wreck once and got my finger
hurt. I am sorry that such message got out on me for I am a married man
and I work hard to care for my family. Would you please send me the
names of the people who claimed such unlawful acts about me.
Dear Sir:
I received your pamphlet on drugs, which I think will be of great
value to me in the future.
Due to circumstances beyond my control I will not be able to attend
this class at the time prescribed on your letter due to the fact that my
working hours are from 7:00 until 4:30.
Dear Sirs, Sir or whatever:
. • . But if governmental officials have nothing better to do than
to sit on their "capitals" and to make lawsuits, heaven help us all. I
know that I may be utterly wrong but until better informed by Higher
sources I will continue to think the same.
Dear Sir:
This is a request to be excluded from the class. Whatever gave you
the belief that I was a member of such a class. I never take drugs.
Maybe an aspirin once in a while, but I can't even take but one of them
at a time.
Dear Sir:
Our son Bill is in the Navy, stationed in the Carribean some place.
Please let us know exactly what kind of drugs he is accused of taking.
from a mother who will help if properly informed.
A worried mother
Jane Doe
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lay persons have with the notice (see responses quoted at note
it is unlikely that any of them represent a threat of multiplicity of suits, but even if they did it is still better, in
the words of Lord Eldon, "to go as far as possible towards
justice than to deny it altogether." 9
The res judicata effect of any judgment entered is
dependent on matters entirely aside from the form of the notice.
The res judicata effect of a class suit judgment is involved
with the distinction between a "compulsory joinder" type suit,
which may be assumed to embrace the provisions of Rule 23(b)
(1)

and (2), and the "common issue" type suit which is embraced

in Rule 23 (b) (3).

These distinctions are exposed in Kalven &

Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8
U.

Chi. L. Rev. 684, 708-14 (1941).

It is there pointed out

8 continued
Dear Mr. Morgan:
I received your card about the lawsuit and I would like to how much
I owe and I can pay it off by the month so I won't have to go to court.
If I can pay by the month, I will do just that as soon as I hear from
you.
To Whom This May Concern:
About this lawsuit, I can't see how you or anyone can build a
case after something I know nothing about, I can't imagine what it's all
about, and about some kind of class I'm supposed to be in. I'm sorry,
I'm in no kind of class, I'm only a mother and housewife, I do not have
any kind of trade or class.
Sorry I can't concern myself in something I have no dealing.
9 Chaffee, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY, 205 (1950) quoting from Duke of
Bedford v. Ellis, L.R. [1901] A.C. 1, 8-11.
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that the "compulsory joinder" type cases "amount to nothing
more than a common question plus a strong policy in favor of
a remedy for the group," citing Shields v. Barrow, 17 How.
130 (1854).

(U.S.)

Such cases are exemplified by the "common fund."

On the other hand, the "common issue" case contemplated by
Rule 23(b) (3), in which a large group may have individual
damage claims which turn on an issue like whether an offering
circular was misleading, do not exhibit the strong policy in
favor of a group remedy though they do present even stronger
needs for judicial efficiency.

In the latter cases, but

not the former, the "opt out" procedure is made available by
the Rule to avoid the effects of "one way intervention" under
the former rule. 10

The giving of notice, therefore, advances

res judicata and appellants simply misconceive class action
procedures in urging otherwise.
At this stage in the proceedings this case could be
either.

It could be a "common fund", composed of assets of

Major Oil which allegedly are being misappropriated.

It could

also constitute a "common issue" type case involving whether
Major Oil's management is guilty of fraud expending itself on
the individual shareholder's interest.
both.

It could also be

It was correct, therefore, for the trial judge to

maintain the action under both theories and furnish the notice

10
See the discussion of Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d
561 (lOth Cir. 1961) pet. cert. dism. 37, U.S. 801 (1963) at pages
21 and 22.
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required in a "corrunon issue" suit.

The giving of notice,

moreover, could only enhance the res judicata effect, to the
extent that it brings the action to the attention of those
affected by it.
The provisions of Rule 23(c) (3) are self-executing
as regards the binding effect of a class action under Rule
23(b) (1) - - i t will be binding on all persons who the Court
determines are members of the class.
Appellants' view that the "opt out" procedure necessarily affects the decree's res judicata effect involves the
very logical fallacies condemned by Keefe, Levy & Donovan's
treatise discussed in Point II.
The cases under the federal rule support that view.
While it is sometimes held that a Rule 23(b) (1) class action
is preferred to avoid the expense of notice, Stavrides

~

Mellon Bank, N.A., 20 F.R. Serv. 2d 1341 (W.D. Pa. 1975), that
is no objection in this case because notice has already been
submitted. On the other hand, it is held that the court may
not defeat the "opt out" provisions by merely labeling the
action a Rule 23 (b)

(1) type class suit, Air Line Stewards

Stewardesses Ass'n. v. American Airlines, 490 F.2d 636

&

(7th

Cir. 1973), and where there are elements of an individual
damage claim the notice and opportunity to opt out is mandatory.
Smith~

Readers Digest Association,

501 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).

Inc., 19 F.R. Serv. 2d

It is also held that in some cases the
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claims must be separated and treated under different provisions
of the Rule.

Williams

~Local

19, Sheet Metal Workers

International Ass'n., 59 FRD 49 (E.D. Pa. 1973);
~Hamilton

C.

International Corp., 62 FRD 413

Richardson

(E.D. Pa. 1974).

The Trial Judge's Action Was Supported by The
Uncontroverted Allegations of the Verified Complaint
Under the revised federal rule, from which Rule 23,

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, was adopted, it is held that it
is error for the trial judge to fail to enter findings on the
three mandatory elements of Rule 23(a), and the alternative
elements of Rule 23(b), in certifying a class action.
~Hirschi,

928

(1969).

402 F.2d 94

Esplin

(lOth Cir. 1968). cert. den. 394

u.s.

We acknowledge that to be sound law, which

should be adopted herein, and even though appellants raise no
question concerning the form of the order certifying the class
action the following observations concerning the posture of this
certification vis-a-vis the Hirschi precedent are appropriate.
This case, unlike Hirschi, arises on the uncontroverted
allegations of the verified complaint.

The allegations of

that complaint, therefore, must be taken as the facts herein.
The four mandatory elements of Rule 23(a)

(i.e., numerosity,

common questions of law or fact, representative claims or
defenses and adequacy of representation) are alleged at
paragraphs 6 and 8 (R.61).

The alternative elements of
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Rule 23(b)

(i.e., a risk of varying or inconsistent adjudi-

cations which would be inconsistent or dispositive, refusal
to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, and
predominance of common questions of law and fact and
superiority of the class action to adjudicate the controversy)
are alleged in paragraph 7 (R.61) of the complaint.

Standing,

as they do, uncontroverted these allegations have the same
dignity in the posture of this case as specific findings.
Moreover, the case stands in quite a different
posture than Hirschi.

This case is at a preliminary pleading

stage, whereas Hirschi was decided on appeal from a final
disposition on a jury verdict.

Thus, a challenge to the trial

judge's orders is premature, or at the very least the matter
should be remanded for the entry of appropriate findings -which is a mere administrative matter in view of the uncontroverted allegations.

If it is thought necessary this Court

may "suggest" on its own initiative, under Rule 75(h), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, that appropriate findings be entered.
Under Rule 75(h) the trial judge may also correct the record
while this appeal is pending, or the matter may be left to
his discretion following remand.

In either event there is no

need, nor is it appropriate, to disturb the action of the
trial judge at this stage in the proceedings.
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1

POINT IV
THE TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY EXERCISED HIS DISCRETION
TO ALLOW MAINTENANCE OF A COMBINATION
DERIVATIVE-REPRESENTATIVE ACTION
The first prong of appellants' dual attack on the
class certification is that, in the view of appellants, the
allegations of the Complaint present what is more properly a
derivative action under Rule 23.1.

Appellants' theory is in

error for at least two reasons.
A.

Representative and Derivative Actions May be Pursued
Simultaneously
Again reasoning without authorities, appellants

urge at Br. 10-11 that if there were not some mutual inconsistency between asserting corporate claims and individual
claims by the shareholders, "Rule 23.1 .
somehow appurtenant to Rule 23 itself."

. would be
In advancing that

argument appellants have evidently forgotten, or choose to
ignore, that Rule 23.1 was, indeed, a mere appurtenance to
Rule 23 itself before the 1972 revision.

11

Rule 23.1 derives

11

Rule 23.1, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is also identical with Rule
23.1, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Its substance was formerly contained in Rule 23(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1937). The
Advisory Committee notes to the 1966 revision of the federal rule indicate
merely that such actions have "distinctive aspects which require the
special provisions set forth in the new rule, but 3 B MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE, ~[23.1.0[1] indicates that the "problem" was whether the
requirements of clause (1) of the rule that the plaintiff be a shareholder violated the rule of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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from the same equity principles as Rule 23.

Appellants concede

that to be so at the bottom of Br. 11, but the implication
that representative actions and derivative actions are therefore common tools in the arsenal of equity techniques, quite
proper to use in tandem as the trial judge has done, escapes
them.
Appellants never suggest any way in which they are
prejudiced by the preliminary certification under both Rules
23 and 23.1.

If that claim is tied to their objection to the

giving of notice, which seems likely, the notes of the Advisory
Committee to the federal rule are conclusive against any such
claim, for the Advisory Committee indicated that "the court
has inherent power to . . . require that any appropriate
notice be given to shareholders or members."
Appellants' "facile 12 equation" advanced at Br. 11
is superfluous, for it is not supported by a single authority.
To the contrary, commentators discuss the two types of proceedings as alternative forms of action,

~-~··

JENNINGS AND

MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION, 958-959 (2d ed. 1968).

The

logic of that position is self evident, for any wrong to the
corporation must necessarily expend itself on the shareholders'
12

Facile: easy to be done or performed; easy; not difficult; performable
or attainable with little labor. The term is well chosen, in the context
of the pleadings, even if the inconsistencies appellants imagine were found
to exist. Rule 8(e) (2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, does permit the
plaintiff to plead inconsistently. In that sense, we concede the "equation"
to be

11

facile".
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interest.

There may not, of course, be a dual recovery, but

there is no reason why the trial judge may not keep both
alternatives open at this stage of the proceedings.

The only

reported Utah case dealing significantly with class actions,
Salt Lake City
286

~Utah

Lake Farmers Association, 4 U.2d 14,

P.2d 773 (1955) was decided under the former rule and

does not arise in a corporate setting, but there are a multitude of cases under the identical federal rule in which
representative and derivative actions are pursued simultaneously.

~.~.,

Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir.

1970).
The maintenance of either form of action is addressed
to the sound discretion of the court, upon the allegation of
the appropriate elements of the respective rules,

King

~

Kansas City Southern Industries, Inc., 519 F.2d 20 (7th Cir.
1975), but the rules are to be liberally construed in favor of
the class action, Id., citing

Esplin~

Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94

(lOth Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969).

In

such circumstances it is held that a court may not deny a
class action on the ground that there is no need for it.
Fujishima ~Board of Education, 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972).
Accord, Esplin~ Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (lOth Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969).

These propositions were

adopted and implemented by the trial Court in Andrew ~ Ideal
National Insurance Co., Docket No. 182960 (3rd Dist. Utah,
1977) following remand in Andrew v. Ideal National Insurance
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Co., 509 F.2d 367 (Utah 1973).
Indeed, the notes of the Advisory Committee for the
federal rule (from which the Utah rule was adopted) refer to
suits for all of the shareholders of a corporation as appropriate class actions, notwithstanding the availability of

~

derivative action:
In an action by policy holders against a
fraternal benefit association attacking a
financial reorganization of the society, it
would hardly have been practical, if indeed
it would have been possible, to confine the
effects of a validation of the reorganization
to the individual plaintiffs. Consequently
a class action was called for with adequate
representation of all members of the
class.
(citing)
For much the same reason
actions ~ shareholders to compel the
declarat~on of a dividen~ the proper
recogn~t~on and-handl~ng of-redempt~on or
pre-empt~on rights, or the like (or actiOns
by the corporation for corresponding
declarations of rights), should ordinarily
be conducted as class act~ons, although the
matter has been much obscured by the
insistence that each shareholder has an
individual claim.
(citing) (These share
holders' actions are to be distinguiShed
from derivat~ve actions ~ shareholders
dealt with in new Rule 23.1).
(emphasis
added)-------The Court is undoubtedly aware that at this point there are
hundreds, and perhaps thousands, of reported cases in the
securities field in which the shareholders of corporations are
represented in class actions.

In fact, the only authority

cited by defendants is a student note in the Harvard Law
Review published in 1958 -- fourteen years before the current
Utah rule and eight years before the federal rule were even
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promulgated and therefore not even pertinent to the matters at
bar.

B.

Pleading Inconsistently is Permitted Under the Rules
in any Event.
It must be remembered that "the party who brings a

suit is master to decide what law he will rely upon," Bell
~Hood,

327

u.s.

678, 681 (1946). It is thus not surprising

that there is a near total absence of authority discussing
any supposed distinction, or mutual inconsistency, between
the representative and derivative forms of actions -- for
the provisions of Rule 8(e) (2) seem dispositive against the
position of defendants:
A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense alternatively or
hypothetically, either in one count or defense
or in separate counts or defenses . . . • A
party may also state as many separate claims or
defenses as he has regardless of consistency and
whether based on legal or on equitable grounds
or on both.
The Utah cases construing Rule 8(e) (2) clearly
hold that the plaintiffs may, at their option, assert inconsistent claims. See Rosander ~Larsen, 14 U.2d 1, 376 P.2d
146 (1962), in which it was held reversible error to require
a plaintiff to make an election at pretrial between negligence
claims and claims under the Workman's Compensation Act.
The amended complaint alleges the elements of a
class action at paragraph 8 and 9 (R.61) and then alleges
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the alternative elements of a derivative action at paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 (R.62).

The rules do not permit the

defendants, or indeed the court at the pleading stage, to
elect between those two theories.
We might well pose the question of why, if "it
makes little practical difference to the Defendants whether
the plaintiffs elect to proceed herein as a Rule 23(b) (1)
class action or as a Rule 23.1 shareholders derivative
suit," Br. 15 Appellants incur the expense of this challenge
to the trial judge's exercise of discretion and urge that
the right of recovery "belongs" to the corporation.

The

answer may be in the disclosure contained in the deposition
of Eugene Dalton, President of Major Oil Corporation, and his
counsel, when queried about the application of Major Oil's
assets to the benefit of Arizona Fuels Corporation as alleged
in the complaint.
MR. AXLAND: Now, as to Hajor Oil receiving
the monies, it is my recollection that the
refund check was made payable to Major Oil
Corporation and Suitter, Axland and Armstrong,
my law firm.
Those funds were delivered to Major Oil
Corporation in January -- and I think it is
in 1976 -- and were undoubtedly utilized to
pay off ongoing expenses of Major Oil
Corporation during that first quarter of
1976.
THE WITNESS:
Arizona Fuels.

But the 98,000 belonged to

Deposition of Eugene Dalton, pages 60-61.

To the same effect,
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see Dalton deposition pages 56, 64, 66-67 and 71.

We hasten

to add that it is not our purpose to question the conduct of
counsel, who we consider of the highest integrity and talent.
The point, however, is that we do not have the same confidence
in Mr. Dalton, who stands charged with fraud, and the imposition of both the receivership and the class action would serve
to permit the court, rather than Mr. Dalton, to decide if the
check made payable to Major Oil Corporation "belonged to
Arizona Fuels."

If, on the other hand, the claim belongs to

the corporate entity Mr. Dalton may be left in a position to
make that determination.
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POINT V
APPOINTMENT OF A RECEIVER IS
APPROPRIATE AND NECESSARY
Appellants urge that appointment of a receiver is
inappropriate, again pointing to various allegations of the
Complaint stated on information and belief.

In doing so they

ignore the allegations which are not stated on information and
belief, which establish that plaintiffs are shareholders of
Major Oil and defendants, other than the corporation, were
its officers, and that the defendant officers are wrongfully
disposing of assets of Major Oil in disregard of the interests
of the plaintiffs and other creditors of Major Oil.

Appellants

raise the curious, and seemingly pointless argument at Br. 6
that in the verification of the Complaint plaintiff Weaver
states that it "is true of his own knowledge, except as to
matters stated on information and belief."
appellants)

(emphasis by

Obviously, the qualification does not apply

to matters not alleged on information and belief, which are
entirely sufficient to support appointment of a receiver.
Appellants' entire argument on this point is mere
surplussage, for it fails to so much as address the pertinent
allegations of the Complaint
information and belief.

i.e., those not stated on

Thus, the Kansas case, and the

passages from Fletcher and American Jurisprudence cited at
Br. 6-7 do not even bear on the subject.
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The matter of appointment of a receiver, like the
matter of maintenance of a class action, is one clearly
committed to the sound discretion of the Court.

~ ~

Daisy Gold Mining Co., 22 Utah 457, 63 Pac. 185 (1900).
Contrary to the representations of defendants, there is time
honored Utah authority on how that discretion is to be
exercised.

Stevens v. South Ogden Land,

Building~

Emp. Co.,

14 Utah, 232, 47 Pac 81 (1896) was a case functionally
identical with the matter at bar, the defendants being officers
and directors of a corporation in which the minority shareholders alleged that the assets were being diverted contrary
to the interests of the shareholders and other creditors.

This

Court observed that appointment of a receiver was designed to
"secure the rights and interests of all those affected by the
fraud" and held that "the ends of distributive justice manifested by this Complaint call for a liberal application of the
flexible principles of equity."

Id. at 83.

Significantly,

and apropos the holding in Stevens, the allegations of the
Complaint, and in particular the allegations at paragraphs 15,
16 , 19 , 2 2 , 2 4 , 2 6 , 31 , 3 4 , 3 5 , 3 6 and 4 6 ( R. 6 3, 6 4-6 5, 6 6 and
68) set up significant claims of fraud, breach of fiduciary
duties and conversion and paragraph 44 (R.67-68) sets up
additional fraud claims which are not stated on information
and belief.

Stevens remains the law in Utah, and has been

reaffirmed in other cases holding that appointment of a re-
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ceiver is appropriate to protect the interests of minority
shareholders and other creditors of a corporation.
Walker Brothers
340, 237 Pac.

Bankers~

228

~,

Intermountain Milling Co., 65 Utah,

(1925).

Considering the Utah policy of liberal application
of the equitable remedy of appointment of a receiver, and the
uncontroverted allegations of the verified Amended Complaint,
it could not be convincingly urged that Judge Dee's appointA-t'
~

ment of a receiver herein was

.-,

abuse of discretion.

More-

over, appellants fail to suggest any way in which they are
prejudiced by the appointment of a receiver.

Their urging at

Br. 8 that it will interfere with the management of the
corporation by its directors is disingenuous, at best, for
the Dalton deposition makes clear that it is already subject
to proceedings functionally equivalent to a bankruptcy by
reason of the appointment of a trustee to take custody of its
affairs in the federal courts.

The appointment of a state

court receiver is thus merely an added safeguard for creditors
and shareholders.

CONCLUSION

The importance of this case may well transcend the
issues between the parties.

Representing, as it does, the

first occasion for this Court to speak on the modern class
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action it also represents an opportunity for the implementation of an enlightened procedural reform which, if properly
conceived, can do much to streamline the judiciary.
That the federal courts have assumed the lead in the
development of class actions is in part attributable to the
fact that rights under federal laws (i.e., securities law,
environmental law, etc.) lend themselves better to the technique, but it is also in large part because there is a body of
precedent in the federal courts that is unavailable in the
state courts.

Accordingly, we urge that this Court take this

occasion to give an expansive reading to Rule 23 which will
enable the courts of this state to take their rightful place
in this important area of procedural reform.
Respectfully submitted,
PAUL N. COTRO-MANES, Esq.
430 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
PARKER M. NIELSON, Esq.
318 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for
Plaintiffs-Respondents
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